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MARTIN* AND BRYAN MERCURIO**

Introduction

The legal and political-economic literature has widely debated whether
and to what extent States should be allowed to take "prudential" regulatory
measures in order to safeguard their financial systemic interests from serious
threats of financial crisis. In the main, most commentators agree that States
should have the right to take prudential measures in derogation of their
trade commitments. But disagreements have emerged over the conditions,
necessity, timing, and length of such measures because there has been
virtually no case law applicable to the subject matter.' A recent dispute
involving financial services at the World Trade Organization (WATO)
provides an opportunity for this article to contribute to the doctrinal debate
on prudential measures by drawing a parallel between trade and investment
perspectives on the matter. 2 Indeed, investment cases relating to regulatory
measures taken in a "state of necessity" following the Argentinean economic
crisis of 2001 have briefly touched upon prudential measures in investment
tribunals.3
* Dr. Antoine P. Martin is a Senior Research Associate focusing on international trade,
investment and financial services at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law.
** Bryan Mercurio is Professor, Associate Dean (Research) and Vice-Chancellor's
Outstanding Fellow of the Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
1. For background information on this debate, see IMF, Reference Note on Trade in Financial
Services, (Sept. 2010); Sydney J. Key, The Doha Round and Financial Services Negotiations
(2003); Inu Barbee & Simon Lester, Financial Services in the TTIP: Making the Prudential
Exception Work, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 953 (2014); Thomas Cottier & Markus Krajewski, What
Role for Non-Discriminationand PrudentialStandards in InternationalLaw?, 13 J. INT'L EcON. L.
817, 817-835 (2010).
2. Appellate Body Report, Argentina - Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WTO
Doc. WT/DS453/AB/R (adopted Apr. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Argentina - Financial Services
Appellate Body Report]; Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services,
WTO Doc. WT/DS453/R (adopted Sept. 30, 2015) [hereinafterArgentina - Financial Services
Panel Report].
3. See Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/07/26, Award (JCSID 2016); Cont'l Cas. Co.
v. Argentine Republic, ARB/03/9, Award (JCSID 2008); Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine
Republic, ARB/02/16, Award (JCSID 2007); Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentine
Republic, ARB/01/03, Award (JCSID 2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/
02/1, Decision on Liability (JCSID 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic,
ARB/01/8, Award (JCSID 2005).
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While this article is not the first to focus on prudential measures, the
literature to date has largely focused on trade-related aspects and only lightly
touched upon the important contribution made by investment tribunals.4
Moreover, no article to date discusses the potential convergence between
WTO case law and investment arbitral law on the issue of measures taken
for prudential reasons relating to economic duress. In this regard, this
article fills a gap in the literature by assessing and, in many respects, linking
the contribution of the recent WTO jurisprudence and the relevant
investment cases pertaining to the notion of prudential measures aimed at
ensuring the security and predictability of their financial system.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I provides background on prudential
measures in the GATS before reviewing the text and doctrinal debate on the
effectiveness of prudential measures.
Part II examines the recent and first WTO dispute which raises and
discusses a range of trade-related issues regarding prudential measures.
-

Argentina - Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (Argentina

-

Financial Services) is instructive in establishing the parameters of a wider
framework for financial regulatory intervention, particularly in times of
economic and systemic duress.5 Discussions on necessity at the WTO have
not traditionally focused on prudential measures justified by economic
duress. Of course, the WTO Appellate Body is well-versed in the concept of
necessity as it relates to trade restrictiveness6 and the scholarship has focused
accordingly on analysing whether a measure is necessary to obtain particular
objectives and meet the tests established and applied by the Appellate Body.:
In contrast, the September 2015 WTO Panel Report in Argentina
FinancialServices and, more recently, the additional findings by the Appellate
Body in April 2016 have provided substance to what has been largely an
academic debate relating to financial services.8 More specifically, the Panel
and Appellate Body reports in Argentina - Financial Services provided a

-

4. See, e.g., Andrew D. Mitchell, Jennifer K. Hawkins & Neha Mishra, Dear Prudence:
Allowances under International Trade and Investment Law for PrudentialRegulation in the Financial
Services Sector, 9 J. INT'L EcON. L. 787, 787-820 (2016).
5. See Argentina - FinancialServices Appellate Body Report, supra note 2; Argentina - Financial
Services Panel Report, supra note 2.
6. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO
Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007); Appellate Body Report, United States
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/
DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter United States - Gambling Appellate Body
Report]; Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WATO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12 2001) [hereinafter
European Communities - Asbestos]; Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef WA/TO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R - WT/DS169/AB/R (adopted
Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea - Frozen Beef].
7. In relation to SPS issues, see Andrew D. Mitchell and Caroline Henckels, Variations on a
Theme: Comparing the Concept of "Necessity" in InternationalInvestment Law and WTO Law, 14(1)
CHI. J. INT'L L. 93, 93-164 (2013).
8. See Argentina - FinancialServices Appellate Body Report, supra note 2; Argentina - Financial
Services Panel Report, supra note 2.
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landmark contribution to the WTO's approach to the handling of financial
services issues generally and more particularly prudential regulatory
initiatives taken for reasons of emergency or in a "state of necessity".9
Part III focuses on the investment perspective. The trade and investment
regimes are of course different and should not be read as interchangeable,
but it is nonetheless interesting to note that a certain degree of convergence
can be found between the trade and investment jurisprudence in regard to
prudential measures. At the same time, it must also be noted that important
gaps appear in the methodology and reasoning between the two regimes. In
more practical terms, while investment cases have tended to preserve the
right of host governments to regulate so as to preserve domestic financial
and economic stability over foreign corporate interests, the tribunals and
Annulment Committees have not been able to formulate a coherent and
robust legal reasoning as to what measures taken for prudential reasons
ought to be considered as valid.o

Part IV concludes with a set of general remarks drawing upon recent
jurisprudence and offers confidence to governments wishing to preserve a
high degree of freedom in times of financial instability.
II.

Background on Prudential Measures

Provisions allowing for the taking of exceptional measures-particularly
for prudential reasons-have long been part of international investment and
trade agreements. The language used and construction of such clauses
rarely differ much between various agreements, however, the structure and
wording of such clauses have raised questions as to the scope of their
applicability (with some viewing the language as self-cancelling and without
any practical effect). To date, the point has mainly been debated in academic
literature, but has only rarely been a point of issue in any international
dispute settlement forum. This section reviews the textual language of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and other agreements
before considering the differing interpretive positions on the practical effect
of such clauses.
A.

THE TEXTUAL LANGUAGE OF PRUDENTIAL PROVISIONS IN

GATS
The GATS provides several general and specific carve-outs and exceptions
to liberalization commitments. This begins with the language of the
Preamble which protects and promotes "the right of Members to regulate,
and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within their
9. Id.
10. See infra Section III. For a similar conclusion, see Mitchell and Henckels, supra note 7, at
93-164.
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territories in order to meet national policy objectives."" The Preamble is
supplemented by hard law provisions including, most notably, Article VI,
which stipulates that domestic measures of general application should be
conducted "in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner."12 In addition,
Article XII on Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments also grants
Members a right act in a manner contrary to its liberalization commitments
in cases of "serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or
threat," provided that "such restrictions shall not be adopted or maintained
for the purpose of protecting a particular service sector" and as long as the
involved government submits to a balance of payment assessment
procedure.'3 These obligations, furthermore, are accompanied by the wellknown and important General Exceptions clause of Article XIV, which
allows for the adoption of certain measures such as those "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health" or "to protect morals or to
maintain public order."1

More relevant to financial stability and to financial services liberalization
more generally is the GATS Annex on Financial Services, which contains a
Domestic Regulation provision allowing for the taking of regulatory
measures "for prudential reasons" related to the protection of investors or to
the preservation of economic and financial stability.5 More specifically, the
Annex states that:
[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member
shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons,
including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier,
or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. 6

11. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
12. Id. art. VI, § 1.
13. Id. art. XII, §§ 1, 3, 5.
14. Id. art. XIV. The Panel in United States - Gambling associated public morals with "the
preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and law" in a
case concerning issues relating to money laundering. United States - Gambling Appellate Body
Report at T 296 (discussing Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R, ¶ 6.467 (adopted Nov. 10, 2004)).
"Hence, in our view, the dictionary definition of the word 'order', read together with [Article
XIV] footnote 5, suggests that 'public order' refers to the preservation of the fundamental
interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and law. These fundamental interests can
relate, inter alia, to standards of law, security and morality." Id. Unsurprisingly, the point was
relied on by the Panel in Argentina - Financial Services. Argentina - Financial Services Panel
Report, at para 7.870.
15. GATS, supra note 11, at Annex on Financial Services, para. 2.
16. Id.
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OTHER INVESTMENT AND TRADE AGREEMENTS

Similar prudential provisions are included in a broad range of regional and
bilateral trade and investment agreements. Referred to by a host of names,
including Exceptions, Domestic Regulation, or Carve-Out provisions, such
prudential provisions are commonly included in every free trade agreement
(FTA) entered into by the United States (except the Jordan agreement),7
including the widely publicized (and, it appears, failed) US-led megaregional Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).'s Likewise, recent EU treaties
such as the EU - Singapore ETA and Canada - EU ETA (CETA) include
such provisions.19
Looking at the fifty-nine agreements listed by the UNCTAD Investment
Policy Hub as being negotiated in 2014 and 2015 a similar trend emerges. 20
Of the twenty-seven most recently negotiated agreements listed in the
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub (available in English) the vast majority
include exceptions through a variety of wordings and methods.21 Of the
twenty-seven agreements, seventeen contain a Prudential Reasons clause,22 a
Domestic Regulations clause23 and/or a General Exceptions provision24
expressly allowing for the taking of regulatory measures "for prudential
reasons." An additional two agreements alternatively incorporate the
previously mentioned GATS Annex on Financial Services into their text so
as to provide parties with prudential exceptions,25 while six agreements
17. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States Free Trade Agreements,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Dec. 5 2015).
18. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement § 11.11.1, Feb. 4, 2016, Office of the United States
Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacificpartnership/tpp-full-text.
19. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada, of the One Part,
and the European Union, Can.-EU, art. 13.16, Oct. 30, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2016/february/tradocA154329.pdf [hereinafter CETA]; Free Trade Agreement Between
the European Union and the Republic of Singapore, EU-Sing., art. 8.50, May, 2015, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961.
20. See UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/II/
MostRecentTreaties#iialnnerMenu (last visited June 11, 2018).
2 1. See id.
22. See, e.g., Agreement Between Japan and the Sultanate of Oman for the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Oman art. 18, June 19, 2015, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3481.
23. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of
the People's Republic of China, Austl.-China, art. 3, Aus. Gov. Dept. of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/chafta/official-documents/Documents/
chafta-agreement-text.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Burkina
Faso for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can. Burk. Faso, art. 18, May 20, 2015,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3460.
25. See Agreement on Investment under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation between Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of
India, ASEAN-India, art. 21, Dec. 11, 2014, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3337; Agreement between Canada and the Republic of
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provide no specific prudential exception but rather rely on general security
interest protection, serious balance-of-payment, external financial
difficulties,26or investment transfer provisions27 to justify what other
agreements refer to as measures taken for prudential reasons, provided that
these measures remain temporary. Of the twenty-seven, only two
agreements fail to explicitly and clearly provide visible prudential exceptions.
One of these two, the 1314 page-long ETA between the Eurasian Economic
Union and Viet Nam allows for General and Security Exceptions and
incorporates Article XIV of the GATS but makes no reference to the
preservation of financial stability.28 The other, the Malaysia - Turkey FTA,
exclusively incorporates GATS XX exceptions relating to public order and
security but ignores the possibility of financial stability-related action.29
C.

DOCTRINAL DEBATE

Despite prudential or carve-out provisions being included in multiple
agreements, a doctrinal debate on whether such provisions are useful and
applicable in practice has emerged in the literature. This debate essentially
relates to the wording of the clauses. Paragraph 2 of the GATS Annex on
Financial Services can be used, for illustration purposes, as a standard carveout provision:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the Agreement, a Member
shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons,
Cameroon for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Cameroon-Can., art. 17, Mar. 03,
2016, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3163.
26. See, e.g., Agreement between Japan and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay for the
Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-Uru., arts. 22-23,Jan. 01, 2015,
UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3284.
27. See Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement between the Federative Republic
of Brazil and the Republic of Malawi, Braz.-Malawi, art. 12, UNCTAD, http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4715;
Agreement between the
Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Isr.-Myan., arts. 6-7,
Oct. 05, 2014, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3161;
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Government of the
Republic of Turkey concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Colom.-Turk., art. 9, July 28, 2014, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/3249; The Investment Promotion Act, Egypt-Mauritius, art. 8.4, June
25, 2014, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3285;
Korea - Australia Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-S. Kor., Annex 11-C, Apr. 08, 2014, Aus. Gov.
Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/officialdocuments/Pages/full-text-of-kafta.aspx.
28. Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Its Member States, of
the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, of the other part, E.E.U.-Viet., art. 1.9,
May 29, 2015, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3455.
29. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the
Republic of Turkey, Malay-Turk., ch. 13, Apr. 17, 2014, Malaysia Ministry of Int'l Trade and
Indus., http://fta.miti.gov.my/miti-fta/resources/Malaysia%20-%20Turkey/MTFTA Main_
Agreement.pdf.
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including for the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier,
or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. Where
such [prudential] measures do not conform with the provisions of the
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member's
commitments or obligations under the Agreement.30
As previously mentioned, the first part of the provision suggests that WTO
Members retain a wide degree of autonomy to control financial services in
case of financial instability or threat thereof. In what some have put down to
poor drafting, however, the last sentence of Article 2(a) implies that such
prudential measures cannot contradict existing GATS obligations, which
leads some to question on whether the prudential provision could ever
permit governmental action in practice.3' More specifically, those
commentators contend that the last sentence has a self-cancelling effect that
prevents WTO Members from taking measures inconsistent with their
WTO obligations.32 Thus, to those commentators, the prudential carve-out
does not actually allow a WTO Member to address systemic risks, because
attempting to do so would breach their WTO commitments.33
Reading the provisions with state regulatory needs in mind and with a
view to avoiding contradictions within the same treaty, as required by Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,34 this article contends
that where threats are identified, prudential measures may legitimately
contradict WTO obligations, provided that they are not used as pretext to
initiate protectionist measures and escape general obligations under the
Agreement. In other words, the last sentence of Article 2(a) is not selfcancelling, but rather constitutes a good faith clause or safeguard against
abuse in a similar fashion to the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS and
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).35
Support for this interpretation has been expressed in various doctrinal
30. GATS, supra note 11, at Annex on Financial Services, § 2(a).
3 1. See, e.g., Lori Wallach & Todd Tucker, Answering CriticalQuestions about Conflicts Between
FinancialRegulation and TO Rules Hitherto Unaddressedby the TO Secretariatand other Official
Sources, PUBLIC CITIZEN (June 22, 2010), 3, https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/memo_unansweredquestions-memoforgeneva.pdf. (stating that "[a]s the second sentence makes
clear, prudential measures are only allowed under GATS if they don't violate any of the GATS rules,
which are very expansive, or operate to reduce a member country's commitments or
obligations."); To Promote Economic Stability, Nations Must Free Themselves from Wf/TO Financial
Deregulation Dictates, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Oct. 2009), 8, https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/
files/introductiontowtoderegulation.pdf (stating that "the provision may only be used to defend
regulatory policies if such policies do not undermine the commitments and obligations
established through the other WTO rules. This effectively eviscerates the use of the provision
. . . self-cancelling second sentence").

32. See, e.g., id.
33. See, e.g., id.
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232.
35. GATS, supra note 11, at art. XIV; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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discussions and carries the weight of the commentaries. For instance, a 2010
note by the International Monetary Fund concluded that "[t]he Annex on
Financial Services includes a 'prudential carve out' clause that recognizes the
right of WTO members to introduce and maintain prudential measures ...
regardless of any other provisions of the GATS" and suggests that "[s]ince
the Annex on Financial Services does not provide any definition or indicative
list of prudential measures that would be covered by this provision,
governments have considerable leeway in introducing prudential measures
that fit their needs."36 Other commentators have noted that the prudential
provision allows financial regulatory authorities to "take measures to ensure
the integrity and stability of the financial system or to protect consumers of
financial services even if these measures are inconsistent with other
provisions of GATS."37 In this regard, Key notes that "[t]he only issues are
whether the measure is, in fact, prudential, and whether it is being used to
avoid

a country's

obligations

or commitments

under the

GATS."38

Similarly, Cottier and Krajewski find that WTO Members may adopt
prudential measures without interference from the VVTO because the
system "preserves national regulatory autonomy and enables each country to
adopt those rules which [it] deems appropriate."39 Finally, in an extensive
analysis of prudential provisions, Barbee and Lester concluded that although
the wording of the prudential regulatory clauses have raised concerns over
effectiveness, the concerns are only "speculative and have been overstated."40
The prudential carve-out provides considerable policy space for regulators
to safeguard the integrity and stability of the financial system, provided "the
non-protectionist purposes offered to justify the measure [is] authentic and
real."4'
Perhaps even more importantly, several governments have also come to
similar conclusions on the role and efficiency of prudential measures. This
includes direct statements on the high degree of autonomy granted to the
WTO Members, notwithstanding the inclusion of the last sentence in
Article 2(a) of the Annex. For instance, former US Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner once stated that the controversial part of prudential
provision was to be read as a guard against abuse and concluded that US
investment treaties and FTAs provided "very substantial and adequate
flexibility for government policy makers to mitigate such risks, including
through the so-called prudential exception and through the monetary and
exchange rate policy exception."42 The effectiveness of the prudential carve36. Reference Note on Trade in FinancialServices, supra note 1, at para. 14.
37. See Key, supra note 1, at 47.
38. Id. at 50.
39. Cottier & Krajewski, supra note 1, at 827.
40. Barbee & Simon, supra note 1, at 954.
41. Id. at 954, 961.
42. Id. at 962 (quoting Letter from Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary, to Rep. Barney
Frank, Inside U.S. Trade (uly 19, 2012), http://insidetrade.com/iwpfile.html?file??dec2 012
%2Fwto20l2_2846a. pdf).
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out provisions have also been confirmed by jurisdictions as diverse as Macao,
Costa Rica, and the EU.43
The recently negotiated CETA goes even further and contains unique and
noteworthy provisions demonstrating solid political intent to strengthen the
prudential carve-outs. For example, Annex 13-C of the agreement
unquestionably demonstrates the parties' commitment to strengthening
financial stability through a "dialogue on the regulation of the financial
services sector," while adding that discussions "shall be based on the
principles and prudential standards agreed at multilateral level."44
Moreover, Annex 13-B makes clear that prudential measures are acceptable
where the parties act in good faith and provides a list of non-exhaustive
"High-Level Principles" including a right of each party to "determine its
own appropriate level of prudential regulation .

.

. and enforce measures that

provide a higher level of prudential protection than those set out in common
international prudential commitments[.]"45 The article also defines a valid
prudential measure as having a non-manifestly disproportionate prudential
objective in the pursuance of the resolution of matters involving the recovery
of non-viable financial institutions and "the preservation or the restoration
of financial stability in response to a system-wide financial crisis."46
Canada and the US have likewise made their intentions clear in a
declaration on the Energy Charter Treaty:
Legitimate policy objectives may justify differential treatment of foreign
Investors or their Investments in order to reflect a dissimilarity of
relevant circumstances between those Investors and Investments and
their domestic counterparts. For example, the objective of ensuring the
integrity of a country's financial system would justify reasonable
prudential measures with respect to foreign Investors or Investments,
where such measures would be unnecessary to ensure the attainment of
the same objectives insofar as domestic Investors or Investments are
concerned. Those foreign Investors or their Investments would thus
not be "in similar circumstances" to domestic Investors or their
Investments.47
In light of the above, and in line with the prevailing view of commentators
and governments, we therefore disagree with the vocal commentators who
question the applicability and feasibility of the prudential provision. To the
43. See KH Lei, Financial Services in the Current TO Framework, Monetary Authority of
Macao (2006), available at http://docplayer.net/5 989501 -Financial-services-in-the-current-wtoframework.html (accessed June 2018).
44. CETA, supra note 19, at Annex 13-C.
45. CETA, supra note 19, at Annex 13-B § 8(a). In addition, the article provides that
"[rielevant considerations in determining whether a measure meets the requirements of Article
13.16.1 include the extent to which a measure may be required by the urgency of the situation
and the information available to the party at the time when the measure was adopted." Id.
§ 8(b).
46. Id. § 8(d) - (e).
47. Consolidated Energy Charter Treaty, art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95.
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contrary, the provisions contained in the GATS Agreement and relevant
Annex and their ETA counterparts provide ample scope for WTO Members
and FTA signatories to utilise the prudential carve-out as a safeguard in
times of financial instability and crisis.
III.

Recent WTO Interpretation of Prudential Measures

-

The limitation of the above conclusion is that governments and
commentators base their conclusions on the effectiveness of the prudential
carve-out provisions simply on a textual analysis of treaty language, if only
because most did not see any relevant case law from which to draw upon.48
The recent WTO panel and Appellate Body reports in Argentina
FinancialServices, however, allow us to supplement doctrinal analysis with
relevant trade jurisprudence. Ignored in this debate, also, is the contribution
of jurisprudence of investment tribunals that have considered the issue of
regulations taken during a state of necessity so as to protect a country's
essential interest.
As previously mentioned, Panama's WTO dispute stemmed from the
Argentine economic crisis. The claim challenged a set of prudential
regulations-in this case in relation to transparency towards remuneration
and interest, control over doubtful increases in wealth, financial
intermediaries pre-market access, operational and foreign exchange trading
requirement, etc.-to which Argentina justified by a state of necessity
claim.49 In this dispute, however, the legal text was not a Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) but the GATS and the Annex on Financial Services.
In Argentina - FinancialServices, the necessity debate considered focused

on both regulatory exceptions and prudential measures for eight financial,
taxation, foreign exchange, and business registration measures. 0 According
to Argentina, the regulations constituted "anti-abuse measures which [were]
essential tools for enforcing national tax laws, guaranteeing taxation and tax
collection, preventing fraudulent practices, tax evasion and tax avoidance, as
well as the erosion of national tax bases."5' At stake was also a financial
information exchange agreement between Argentina and various taxcooperative countries which Argentina preventively extended to Panama
prior to the effective signing of an agreement. 52 To Panama, however,
Argentina's measures and corresponding restrictions infringed upon its
market access commitment in the financial services sector.53 The remainder
48. See, e.g., Barbee & Lester, supra note 1, at 954; U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development, Poliy Space to Prevent and Mitigate Financial Crises in Trade and Investment
Agreements, 8, UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/G24/2010/1 (May 2010).
49. See Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report, supra note 2.
50. Id. at T 2.9.
51. Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report, supra note 2, T 2.
52. See id.
53. Id. T¶ 3.1 - 3.3.
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of this sub-section reviews the claims made and decision taken in relation to
both the regulatory exceptions and prudential measures.
A.

REGULATORY EXCEPTIONS UNDER ARTICLE

XIV

OF THE

GATS

The Panel in Argentina - FinancialServices first considered whether the

allegedly prudential measures taken by Argentina qualified as relevant
exceptions under Article XIV of the GATS.54 Article XIV is the general
exception clause (akin to Article XX of the GATT) which in this case would
allow measures necessary to secure compliance with laws aiming at
preventing fraudulent practices, subject of course to satisfaction of the
chapeau.55 The relevant portion of Article XIV reads as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures:
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including
those relating to:
(i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal
with the effects of a default on services contracts[.]
An important question remains, therefore, regarding what constitutes a
necessary measure compatible with the exception clause.
B.

IDENTIFYING "NECESSARY MEASURES"

The WTO has a long line of jurisprudence on the general exceptions
clause, and while the majority of the cases consider Article XX of GATT,56
this jurisprudence is relevant to Article XIV of GATS.57 When analysing
54. Id. T 7.61.
55. GATS, supra note 11, at art. XIV.
56. Prominent disputes in which the Appellate Body has considered Article XX include
Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketingof Seal Products, WATO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R - WT/DS401/AB/R (May 22, 2014)
[hereinafter EC - Seal Products]; Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Related to the
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/AB/R - WT/DS395/AB/R
-WT/DS398/AB/R (adopted Jan. 30, 2012); Appellate Body Report, Thailand - Customs and
Fiscal Measures on Cigarettesfrom the Philippines, WATO Doc. WT/DS37 1/AB/R (adopted June
17, 2011); Appellate Body Report, Brazil - MeasuresAffecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO
Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007); Korea - Frozen Beef Appellate Body Report,
United States - Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/
AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United States - Standardsfor Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WATO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996).
57. See, e.g., United States - Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, ¶ 291 (stating that
"Article XIV of the GATS sets out the general exceptions from obligations under that
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whether a measure conforms to the general exception clause the first task of
a panel is to determine whether the challenged measure falls within the
scope of the clause as set out in the enumerated list (i.e. is a measure
"necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement").58 When this has been
established, the panel then ascertains whether the measure has been applied
appropriately-that is, it does not fall afoul of the requirements of the
chapeau.59
In regards to the first part of the test, the Panel referred to Appellate Body
decisions interpreting the equivalent GATT Article XX general
exceptions-in particular Brazil - Retreaded Tyres and EC - Seal Productsand followed the precedent that in order for a measure to be necessary the
respondent must establish that the measure contributed to the goal pursued
and that the design, structure and operation of the measures offered an
"ends and means relationship with the objectives pursued."60 After a
Agreement in the same manner as does Article XX of the GATT 1994. Both of these provisions
affirm the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the paragraphs of these provisions
even if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in other provisions of
the respective agreements, provided provisions of the respective agreements, provided that all of
the conditions set out therein are satisfied. Similar language is used in both provisions, notably
the term 'necessary' and the requirements set out in their respective chapeaux. Accordingly,
like the Panel, we find previous decisions under Article XX of the GATT 1994 relevant for our
analysis under Article XIV of the GATS."). For a brief summary of the general interpretative
principles of Article XX, see SIMON LESTER, ET AL., WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS
AND COMMENTARY 363-74 (Oxford, 2nd ed. 2012).
58. GATS, supra note 11, at art. XIV § (c)
59. The chapeau of Article XX reads "[slubject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade[.]" GATT, supra note 35, at art. XX. "Article XIV of the GATS, like Article XX of the
GATT 1994, contemplates a 'two-tier analysis' of a measure that a Member seeks to justify
under that provision. A panel should first determine whether the challenged measure falls
within the scope of one of the paragraphs of Article XIV. This requires that the challenged
measure address the particular interest specified in that paragraph and that there be a sufficient
nexus between the measure and the interest protected. The required nexus-or 'degree of
connection'-between the measure and the interest is specified in the language of the
paragraphs themselves, through the use of terms such as 'relating to' and 'necessary to'. Where
the challenged measure has been found to fall within one of the paragraphs of Article XIV, a
panel should then consider whether that measure satisfies the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XIV." United States - Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 6, ¶ 292.
60. See Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report supra note 2, ¶¶ 7.684 - 7.688. "We first
examine the design, structure and operation of the measures in question. We shall focus in
particular on determining whether there is an ends and means relationship between the
objective pursued and the measures in question." Id. T 7.688. The panel also made reference to
EC - Seal Products. "A measure's contribution is thus only one component of the necessity
calculus under Article XX. This means that whether a measure is "necessary" cannot be
determined by the level of contribution alone, but will depend on the manner in which the
other factors of the necessity analysis, including a consideration of potential alternative
measures, inform the analysis .... Indeed, the very utility of examining the interaction between
the various factors of the necessity analysis, and conducting a comparison with potential
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thorough review, the Panel concluded that, given OECD and G20 efforts
against harmful tax practices, most of the measures at issue individually and
conjunctively contributed to achieving the anti-abuse goal.61 The protection
of the tax system against the risks posed by harmful tax practices and money
laundering constituted a primordial goal "of the utmost importance,"62 had a
"limited restrictive effect on international trade in services" and were overall
"necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which [were] not
inconsistent" with GATS Article XIV.63
As to the second part of the test, the panel, somewhat surprisingly, found
that the measures provided unequal treatment amongst countries because
Panama-which had not yet exchanged tax information and initiated the
case as the complainant-had been given cooperative country status.

64

By so

doing, the panel held that Argentina distorted competition and provided
"unequal treatment" to services and service providers from countries that did
effectively provide such information to Argentina.65 The panel, in other
words, found that Argentina's inclusion of Panama on the list of cooperating
countries, in anticipation of and in order to encourage the rapid conclusion
of a tax treaty between the two countries (but without any exchange of
information taking place), was not detrimental to Panama but was
discriminatory to the other countries effectively cooperating with
Argentina.66 The privilege granted to Panama, in turn, was held to generate
counterproductive distortions, i.e. the creation of an unfair burden on the
services and service providers from effectively-cooperating countries,67 and
thus considered as "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination within the
meaning of the chapeau of Article XIV of the GATS."68
The Appellate Body agreed that the measures fell within the scope of
Article XIV, and thus were
designed to secure compliance with the laws or regulations identified by
Argentina[,]

. . . discourage harmful tax practices and enable the

authorities to ensure that Argentine residents are taxed on all their
earnings .

.

. and that earnings from activities performed in Argentina

alternative measures, is that it provides a means of testing these factors as part of a holistic
weighing and balancing exercise, whether quantitative or qualitative in nature." Id. ¶ 7.686

(quoting EC - Seal Products, T 5.215).
61. See Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report supra note 2, T 7.713.
62. Id. T 7.738. "The Panel has found that the protection of its tax collection system and the
fight against harmful tax practices and money laundering are interests or values of the utmost
importance for Argentina." Id.
63. Id. T 7.739. Panama, in addition, failed to identify alternative less trade-restrictive
measures reasonably available to Argentina. Id.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. TT 7.278 - 7.289.
Id. TT 7.292 - 7.293.
See id.
Id. TT 7.752 - 7.753.
Id. T 7.762.
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by domestic or foreign service suppliers are subject to taxation in
Argentina . . ."69
This was to be done in a GATS-consistent manner so that they
"contribute[d] to achieving the objectives pursued."70 The Appellate Body
began its analysis by reviewing the Panel's approach in terms of trade
restriction impacts, taking note of the Panel's conclusion that the measures
did not prevent the supply of services by service suppliers of non-cooperative
countries 71 and reiterating the Panel's reasoning that Argentina's measures
overall had to be designed broadly so as to cover all harmful transactions.72
The Appellate Body then reiterated that an Article XIV(c) analysis of
necessity requires a panel "to assess, in a qualitative or quantitative manner,
the extent of the measure's contribution to the end pursued" and found that
the Panel had "in fact included an appropriate analysis of the contribution
made by [the measures] to securing compliance with specific rules,
obligations, or requirements."73 But whilst the Panel had justified part of its
analysis by making reference to OECD and G-20 initiatives,74 the Appellate
Body questioned recourse to "concepts that are not defined in the WTOcontext"-including the creation of "'a level playing field', and 'unintended
competitive advantages' "-to legitimise GATS-inconsistent measures. 75
C.

"PRUDENTIAL MEASURES

UNDER THE ANNEX ON FINANcIAL

SERVICES

The Panel and Appellate Body reports in Argentina - Financial Services

also considered whether certain Argentine measures-including
requirements relating to reinsurance services and requirements for access to
the Argentine capital market-could, furthermore, qualify under paragraph
2 (Domestic Regulations) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services as
measures taken for prudential reasons, i.e. to protect investors, financial
service suppliers or, more generally, the integrity and stability of the
financial system. 76 The Panel began its analysis by stating:
69. Argentina - Financial Services Appellate Body Report supra note 2, T 6.185.
70. Id. T 6.194 (quoting Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report, T 7.717). The Appellate
Body did have some points of contention with the Panel's analysis. See id. T 6.221.
71. Id. ¶¶ 6.195 - 6.197.
72. Id. T 6.214 (referring to Argentina - FinancialServices Panel Report, T 7.726).
73. Id. T¶ 6.233 - 6.234.
74. Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report, supra note 2, ¶¶ 7.511 - 7.52 1.
75. Argentina - Financial Services Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, ¶¶ 6.139 - 6.141. "[A]
measure either modifies the conditions of competition in the marketplace, thus according less
favourable treatment, or it does not. However, . . . the Panel effectively employed a standard
whereby certain regulatory aspects, as alleged by a Member in a particular dispute, could
"convert" a measure that accords less favourable treatment, and is therefore inconsistent with
Article XVII of the GATS, into a measure that is GATS-consistent." Id.
76. Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report, supra note 2, ¶ 7.82 1.
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it can be inferred from the wording of paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on
Financial Services that Argentina must demonstrate that two
requirements have been met in order to avail itself of the exception,
namely: (i) that the measure in question was taken for prudential
reasons and (ii) that the measure is not being used as a means of
avoiding its commitments or obligations under the GATS.77
It then proceeded to analyse the Argentina measures under both prongs of
the test.78
In analysing whether the measures in question were taken for prudential
reasons, the Panel drew a firm distinction between "prudential measures"
and "measures taken for prudential reasons" and concluded that in order to
fall within the provision "it is the reason which must be "prudential" and not
the measure per se."79 In other words, the prudential factor does not relate to
a certain type of measure but to the circumstances justifying the measure.80
In explaining the concept of prudential reasons, the Panel then considered
the circumstances characteristic of prudential decisions.81
1.

Prevention Role

Using a dictionary definition, the Panel determined that prudential
measures are "preventive or precautionary" in nature8 2 and could thus
include an "extremely broad" number of measures in quantitative terms.83 In
this regard, the Panel found the prudential reasons listed in paragraph 2(a) to
be indicative rather than exhaustive (in contrast to that of GATS Article
XIV).84 Following the jurisprudence of the GATT/GATS General
Exception clause the Panel concluded that prudential measures under
Paragraph 2 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services should be read in a
broad manner and, in so doing, also expressed concerns as to the "serious
systemic implications of the narrow interpretation" of such provisions.85
Hence, the Panel found that Members "are entitled to determine the level of
protection they consider appropriate"6 and that the "nature and scope of
financial regulation at different times reflect the knowledge, experience and
scales of values of governments at the moment in question."87 In this regard,
the Panel stated that Members
77. Id.
78. Id. T 7.822.
79. Id. T 7.861.
80. Id. "[T]he exception makes it possible to exempt or exonerate any measure affecting the
supply of financial services that has been taken 'for prudential reasons."' Id.
81. See id. ¶¶ 7.864 - 7.945.
82. Argentina-FinancialServices Panel Report, supra note 2, ¶ 7.868
83. Id. T 7.869.
84. Id.
85. Id. T 7.848.
86. Id. T 7.870 (citing United States - Gambling Panel Report, at para. 6.461; European
Communities - Asbestos, at para. 168; Korea - Frozen Beef at para. 176).
87. Id. ¶ 7.871.
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should have sufficient freedom to define the prudential reasons that
underpin their measures, in accordance with their own scales of values
...
such as "the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service
supplier" or "the integrity and stability of the financial system[.]"88
2.

PrudentialCause

In a related manner, the Panel made an important distinction between a
prudential measure and a measure taken for prudential reasons. 89 Analysing
the text of paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services on the basis of
the ordinary meaning of its terms as provided under the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, the Panel again resorted to the dictionary and found
that a "measure taken 'for' prudential reasons would . . . be a measure with a

prudential cause."90 Accordingly, it came to the conclusion that a rational
relationship must exist between "the measure and its prudential objective"
and that "the measure must be fit for the purpose of preventing the event, or
the effects resulting therefrom, which the measure is intended to avoid" is in
line with the notion that in "the measure's design, structure and architecture
there must be a rational relationship of cause and effect between the measure
and the prudential reason for it."91 The Panel concluded:
the word "for" in the phrase "measures for prudential reasons" denotes
a rational relationship of cause and effect between the measure and the
prudential reason. Thus, the Member taking the measure in question
must demonstrate that in its design, structure or architecture there is a
rational relationship of cause and effect between the measure it seeks to
justify under paragraph 2(a) and the prudential reason provided. A
central aspect of this rational relationship of cause and effect is the
adequacy of the measure to the prudential reason, that is, whether the
measure, through its design, structure and architecture, contributes to
achieving the desired effect.92

The Panel, accordingly, went on to state that whether a measure has been
taken "for prudential reasons" (i.e. whether there is a rational relationship of
cause and effect between the measure and the reason), must be determined
"on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the particular characteristics of
88. Argentina-FinancialServices Report, supra note 2, T 7.871. Such an interpretation, the Panel
stated, is in accordance with the fourth recital of the preamble to the GATS, which recognizes
"'the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives."' Id. ¶ 7.872 (quoting
GATS, supra note 11, at the Preamble).
89. Id. TT 7.880 - 7.892.
90. Id. T 7.888. "A measure taken 'for' prudential reasons would therefore be a measure with a
prudential cause." Id.
91. Id. T 7.889.
92. Id. T 7.891.
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each situation and each dispute."93 In the present dispute, the measures were
found to be of a prudential type under Paragraph 2(a) but the Panel held that
they had not been taken "for prudential reasons" and were thus inconsistent
with the latter requirement.94
The Appellate Body did not contradict the Panel, instead reiterating that a
Member shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential
reasons, 95 confirming the idea that measures deemed prudential in nature
could fall under the scope of an Annex exception, but insisting that no
exception could be used to escape existing commitments.96 In essence, the
Appellate Body substantiated the Panel's conclusions as to a right of the
Members to regulate and made it clear that the GATS' exception provisions
were designed with these considerations in mind.97
3.

TemporalAspects

Similar to the investment tribunals, the Panel also considered whether
measures taken for prudential reasons must be temporary in nature and
whether they may be taken as a result of an imminent threat. In so doing, it
took a holistic approach and focused on two main points.
First, the Panel emphasised that anticipatory prudence was legitimate
because - financial crises being varied, complex and susceptible to emerge
suddenly - it is difficult for governments to anticipate their consequences.
The Panel admitted that the risks stemming from financial instability evolve
as crises unfold9s and, in fine, concluded that paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on
Financial Services authorized VVTO Members to protect their financial
systems from systemic risks in a forward looking, precautionary and
anticipatory 'ex ante' prudential manner. 99 The Panel's finding that the risk,
injury or danger that a government is seeking to guard against "does not
necessarily have to be imminent",100 therefore, contrasts with the
conclusions of investment tribunals on the matter.
Second, in holding that a measure taken for prudential reasons required a
prudential cause, the Panel could easily reject Panama's assertion that
"prudential measures should be transitional, provisional or short-term in
93. Id.
94. Id. TT 7.946 - 7.949.
95. Argentina - Financial Services Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, TT 6.254-6.255.
96. Id. TT 6.244-6.246.
97. Id. T 6.260.
98. Argentina - Financial Services Panel Report, supra note 2, T 7.878 ('... it is important to
understand that 'systemic' problems may be incubating or gestating over the course of time and
erupt rapidly; hence the importance of being prepared for them in advance").
99. Id. T 7.790. (Financial crises 'are typically latent and extremely difficult to identify
beforehand, making it practically impossible to deal with those risks by taking corrective
measures. This is precisely why paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services authorizes
WTO Members to take measures for prudential reasons to deal with risks of a systemic nature
ex ante"). In this regard, the Panel also cited the third-party submissions of the EU, U.S., and
Brazil. See also id. T 7.873.
100. Id. T 7.879.
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nature".o1 Instead, the panel found that the time factor was to be read in
light of the causes justifying the measures and thus concluded that measures
taken for prudential reasons "can remain in place .

.

. for as long as the

factual circumstances that justified their adoption continue to exist."102
Furthermore, the panel insisted that "nothing in the ordinary meaning of
the words 'prudential reasons' conveys the idea of a time-limit" and added
that "as a matter of principle" troubles raising prudential concerns "may give
rise to long-lasting measures to avoid the recurrence of similar situations in
the future."103 Such a position demonstrates an awareness of the trade
regime as part of a larger, integrated world system as opposed to myopically
focusing on trade specific obligations.
III.

Investment Jurisprudence

While the WTO had not dealt with any right to regulate issues prior to
Argentina -

Financial Services, issues relating to financial stability and

financial services have been considered by investment tribunals.
Problematically, however, these tribunals have not created a robust and
consistent set of case law. On the contrary, some of the tribunals which had
an opportunity to explore the issue provided elements of answers on how
prudential measures should be handled, but in the main the tribunals failed
to reach coherent conclusions. For this reason, it is not possible to clearly
assert the position of international investment law. What is possible,
however, is to state that the trend coming out of these cases is one of which
favours general "prudential freedom". Interestingly, and as will later be
discussed in more detail, even some tribunals which dismissed claims on
jurisdictional grounds (and therefore did not discuss the issues in detail)
made intriguing observations on the relevance of prudential regulations.
A.

LEADING CASES

In recent years, the issue of measures taken for prudential financial
stability reasons has been discussed in six publicly available cases filed against
Argentina - LGAE, CMS, Enron, Sempra, Continental Casualty and UrbaserIo4
101. Id. T 7.890.
102. Id. T 7.890 (citations omitted). ('an "imminent" danger may give rise to long-lasting
measures to avoid the recurrence of similar situations in the future'. . . 'they may be urgent
measures to confront an imminent risk, temporary or provisional measures, or even permanent
(or long-lasting) measures, which might be taken even in the absence of an imminent risk that
would prevent fulfilment of one of the motives or reasons mentioned in that paragraph.' It is
therefore, 'the nature of the situation that threatens a particular prudential objective that will
dictate the nature of the measure').
103. Id. T 7.890.
104. See Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/07/26, Award (ICSID 2016) [hereinafter
Urbaser Award]; Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/03/9, Award (ICSID 2008)
[hereinafter Continental Casualty]; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ARB/02/16,
Award (ICSID 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award]; Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, LP v.
Argentine Republic, ARB/01/03, Award (ICSID 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award]; LG&E
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In the main, arbitral
- as well as in three annulment proceedings.10
tribunals have identified two different ways of assessing Argentina's legal
ability to take adverse measures justified on economic duress in the country.
Some tribunals have mainly relied on "non-precluded measures" clauses as a
means to identify exceptions to treaty obligations in certain situations.
Alternatively, other tribunals have rather allowed the notion of "necessity"
under Customary International Law (as provided by Article 25 of the ILC
draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts)
to prevail over NPM provisions. Interestingly, however, while the
jurisprudence coming from the investment cases lacks coherence, it
nonetheless points in the same direction as that of the WTO decision in
Argentina - FinancialServices.
1.

Non Precluded Measures

In two cases, the LGrE and Continental Casualty, the tribunals gave weight
to the so-called "non-precluded measures" (NPM) treaty clauses which they
considered as lex specialis exempting the State from its treaty obligations.106
NPM clauses commonly ensure that treaty obligations shall not preclude
the application by either party of measures necessary for the maintenance of
public order or the protection of essential security interests.107 The relevant
provision in both disputes, Article XI of the Argentina - US BIT, reads as
follows: "This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international
peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests."os
Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (ICSID 2006)
[hereinafter LG&E Award]; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/01/8,
Award (ICSID 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award].
105. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/01/3, Annulment
Proceeding (ICSID 2010) [hereinafter Enron Annulment Decision]; Sempra Energy Int'l v.
Argentine Republic, ARB/02/16, Annulment Proceeding (ICSID 2010) [hereinafter Sempra
Annulment Decision]; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ARB/01/8,
Annulment Proceeding (ICSID 2007) [hereinafter CMS Gas Annulment Decision]. See also
Antoine Martin, Investment Disputes after Argentina's Economic Crisis: Interpreting BIT NonPrecluded Measures and the Doctrine of Necessity under Customary InternationalLaw 29 J. INT'L
ARB. 1 (2012) (more complete analysis).
106. Continental Casualty, supra note 104, para. 163-68; LG&E Award, supra note 104, at para.
92-99.
107. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Argentina, art. 10, entered into
force Oct. 20, 1994, 31 I.L.M. 124 ("This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfilment of its
obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or
the Protection of its own essential security interests.").
108. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Argentina, entered into force Oct.
20, 1994, 31 I.L.M. 124.
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Article 1410 of the NAFTA fulfils the same goals as the abovementioned
BIT but provides more space to the host by providing for financial stability
and financial market-related exceptions. More specifically, the Article
provides that: "nothing [. . .] shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting or maintaining reasonable measures for prudential reasons, such as:
(a) the protection of investors, depositors, financial market participants,
policyholders, policy claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is
owed by a financial institution or cross-border financial service
provider;
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial
responsibility of financial institutions or cross-border financial service
providers; and
(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a Party's financial system.1 09
In other words, NPM clauses operate as exception clauses capable of
precluding the wrongfulness of an action deemed in breach of the applicable
treaty. Drafting differences between and among the various treaties,
however, make it difficult to authoritatively assert how the clauses operate
and/or would be interpreted in a dispute.
Recognizing the possibility of an exception under NPM clauses,110
nonetheless, the tribunal in LGrE held that given the aggregate devastating
economic, political and social conditions, the domestic regulations taken by
Argentina could qualify as "necessary and legitimate measures" capable of
precluding wrongfulness."' The tribunal in Continental Casualty, similarly,
concluded that "a severe economic crisis [could] thus qualify under Art. XI as
affecting an essential security interest" of the state despite the absence of a
"total collapse" of the system and justify an exception because, overall,
"there is no point in having such protection if there is nothing left to
protect".112

2.

Necessity under Customary InternationalLaw

The tribunals in CMS, Sempra and Enron adopted a different approach.
While noticing the existence of NPM clause, they however considered that
necessity as provided under Article 25 of the ILC draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts could justify an
exemption to existing commitments under Customary International Law
(CIL). As a reminder, Article 25 reads as follows:
Article 25. Necessity
109. Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1410, March
1993, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
110. It should be noted here that while the LG&E tribunal built its argumentation focusing on
a NPM logic, it also confirmed its reasoning by applying the customary international law test to
the case, as a mere formality. See LG&E Award, supra note 104, at para. 245-249.
111. Id. at para 240.
112. Continental Casualty, supra note 104, at para. 174-80.
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Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding
the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is the only way for the
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent
peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the
State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the
international community as a whole.
In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in
question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the
State has contributed to the situation of necessity."3

In other words, while the previous section considered the possibility of
lifting state responsibility for treaty breaches on the basis of a treaty
exception and in particular circumstances related to public order and, in
certain cases, financial stability, Article 25 ILC provides an additional source
of exemption grounded on Customary International Law aimed at
preserving the "essential interest" of a state "against a grave and imminent
peril."1'4

In practice, this approach led to complex and questionable considerations
because it required a review of numerous issues such as whether the situation
faced by Argentina (a) threatened its essential interests"s; (b) represented a
grave and imminent peril16; (c) was the only way available to settle the

issue1; (d) had not been created by Argentina itselfils; and (e) was
temporary.11 9 The CMS, Enron and Sempra decisions, overall, rejected the
argument that an economic crisis could compromise a state's existence as
being "not convincing",120 and in CMS the tribunal rejected a finding of
113. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. 53rd Sess., art. 25, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
114. Id.
115. See Sempra Award, supra note 104, at para. 374; see Enron Award, supra note 104, at para.
332; see LG&E Award, supra note 104, at para. 251; see CMS Award, supra note 104, at para.
359.
116. See Sempra Award, supra note 104, at para. 329-332; see Enron Award, supra note 104, at
para. 306; see LG&E Award, supra note 104, at para. 253-57; see CMS Award, supra note 104, at
para. 322, 354-56.
117. See Sempra Award, supra note 104, at para. 351; see Enron Award, supra note 104, at para.
309; see LG&E Award, supra note 104, at para. 257; see CMS Award, supra note 104, at para.
323, 355-56.
118. See Sempra Award, supra note 104, at para. 374; see Enron Award, supra note 104, at para.
332; see LG&E Award, supra note 104, at para. 251; see CMS Award, supra note 104, at para.
359.
119. See Sempra Award, supra note 104, at para. 255-56; see Enron Award, supra note 104, at
para. 219-224; see LG&E Award, supra note 104, at para. 251; see CMS Award, supra note 104, at
para. 382.
120. See Sempra Award, supra note 104, at para. 348-49; see Enron Award, supra note 104, at
para. 306; see CMS Award, supra note 104, at para. 319-22, 354-58.
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Customary International Law-grounded necessity because the
"constitutional order was not on the verge of collapse".121
In the end, these three decisions were subsequently annulled, with the
Annulment proceedings in both Sempra and CMS concluding that NPM
provisions indeed allowed for measures which deviate from treaty
obligations without compensation being due,122 while the Enron Annulment
Committee questioned the tribunal's reasoning before concluding that it had
no jurisdiction to make its own findings on the matter.1 23
What is interesting and worth noting is that all three annulment
proceedings provided analogous reasoning in suggesting that, contrarily to

the reasoning formulated in the respective awards, NPM treaty provisions
and Customary international Law exceptions could not be considered as
equals or in a similar fashion. In this regard, the CMS Annulment
Committee emphasised that NPM and CIL exceptions had "different
operation and content" and stated that NPM treaty clauses could not be
analysed and applied in light of CIL clauses, which must be interpreted
separately.124 Hence, it concluded that the tribunal had failed to analyse the
NPM clause:
123. "The problem is, however, that the Tribunal stopped there and
did not provide any further reasoning at all in respect of its decision
under Article XI."125

124. "Along those lines, the Tribunal evidently considered that Article
XI was to be interpreted in the light of the customary international law
concerning the state of necessity and that, if the conditions fixed under
that law were not met, Argentina's defense under Article XI was
likewise to be rejected."126
131. "Those two texts having a different operation and content, it was
necessary for the Tribunal to take a position on their relationship and to
decide whether they were both applicable in the present case. The
Tribunal did not enter into such an analysis, simply assuming that
Article XI and Article 25 are on the same footing.
121. CMS Award, supra note 104, at para. 322. See also W. Burke-White & A. von Staden,
Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded
Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties 48 VA. J. INTL. L. (2008). But cf Martin, supra
note 105, at 66.
122. Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 105, at para. 115. See also CMS Annulment
Decision, supra note 105, at para. 133-35.
123. Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 105, at para. 408 ("Having annulled these findings
of the Tribunal, the Committee cannot go further and make its own findings as to whether or
not Argentina is entitled to rely on the principle of necessity under customary international law
or on Article XI of the BIT, or as to whether or not Argentina is responsible for breaches of its
obligations vis-)-vis the Claimants under the fair and equitable treatment clause and umbrella
clause of the BIT. These questions could only be determined by a tribunal, in the event that
either party were to request resubmission pursuant to Article 52(6) of the ICSID Convention.").
124. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 105.
125. Id. at para. 123
126. Id. at para. 124.
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132. In doing so the Tribunal made another error of law. One could
wonder whether state of necessity in customary international law goes
to the issue of wrongfulness or that of responsibility. But in any case,
the excuse based on customary international law could only be
subsidiary to the exclusion based on Article XI."127
133. "Article XI and Article 25 thus construed would cover the same
field and the Tribunal should have applied Article XI as the lex specialis
governing the matter and not Article 25."
134. "Only if it concluded that there was conduct not in conformity
with the Treaty would it have had to consider whether Argentina's
responsibility could be precluded in whole or in part under customary
international law."128

The Enron and Sempra Annulment Committees formulated similar
reasoning to reach the same conclusion. The Enron Committee, however,
did apply a largely procedural methodology while the Sempra Committee
was more forceful in stating that CIL cannot equate treaty exceptions. More
specifically, the Committee in the Enron Annulment proceedingsl29 focused
on whether the tribunal provided reasons for its decision before finding the
reasoning problematic due to the tribunal giving primacy to CIL over the
explicit treaty exception under Article XI of the BIT without considering to
what extent Article 25 ILC could apply in the relevant situation. Hence,
with the CIL reasoning failing, the treaty exception could likewise not be
applied:
394. "The final issue considered by the Tribunal was whether the BIT
itself "excludes the possibility of invoking necessity", thereby precluding

reliance on that principle in terms of Article 25(2)(a) of the ILC
Articles. At paragraph 310 of the Award, the Tribunal said that it would
discuss this issue subsequently. The Committee finds that the Tribunal
did not subsequently make any determination of this question."130
403. "[. . .] The apparent meaning of these paragraphs is that the
Tribunal found that the effect of Article XI of the BIT is the same or
similar to the effect of Article 25 of the ILC Articles, or at least, that the
expression "measures necessary for . . . the Protection of its own essential

security interests" in Article XI of the BIT has the same or similar
meaning as the expression "[an act that is] the only way for the State to
safeguardan essential interest againsta grave and imminent peril" in Article

25 of the ILC Articles. The Committee finds that the reasons for the
Tribunal in reaching the conclusion are sufficiently clear, that it is not
for the Committee to determine whether or not that interpretation was
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at para. 131-32.
Id. at para. 134.
Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 105.
Id. at para. 394.
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correct, and the Committee accordingly finds no annullable error in
these paragraphs of the Award."'3'

405. "The Committee has concluded above that the Tribunal's finding
that the requirements of Article 25 of the ILC Articles are not satisfied
in this case must be annulled.132 Because that finding formed the basis
of the Tribunal's finding that Article XI of the BIT was inapplicable in
this case, the Committee concludes that the latter finding of the
Tribunal must also be annulled."
Overall, while the Committee refused to take a position on whether Article
XI of the treaty could equate to CIL exceptions, it nonetheless suggested
that in practice both preclusion sources had to be considered and analyzed
separately.
By contrast, the Annulment Committee in the Sempra Proceedings33
insisted that a treaty's lex specialis (the NPM clause) would have to be applied
first, before even considering the possibility of a CIL exception, and
explicitly rejected the idea that CIL exceptions could prevail over treaty
exceptions. In fact, the Committee went as far as to explain that while a CIL
exception was meant to make a wrongful act non-compensable, a treaty
exception was rather intended to make the same type of act lawful from the
beginning:
196. "In the opinion of the Committee, the reasoning of these passages
compels the conclusion that the Tribunal did not deem itself to be
required - or even entitled - to consider the applicability of Article XI,
both because this provision did not deal with the legal elements
necessary for the legitimate invocation of a state of necessity and
because the Tribunal found that the Argentine economic crisis did not
meet the customary international law requirements as set out in Article
25 of the ILC Articles."134
197. "[. . .] It does not follow, however, that customary law (in casu,

Article 25 of the ILC Articles) establishes a peremptory "definition of
necessity and the conditions for its operation". While some norms of
customary law are peremptory (fus cogens), others are not, and States
may contract otherwise [. . .]"135
198. "[.

. .] Article XI differs in material respects from Article 25

199. "It is apparent from this comparison that Article 25 does not offer
a guide to interpretationof the terms used in Article XI. The most that
131. Id. at para. 403.
132. Id. at para. 405.
133. Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 105.

134. Id. at para. 196.
135. Id. at para. 197.
136. Id. at para. 198.
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can be said is that certain words or expressions are the same or
similar." 137
200. "More importantly, Article 25 is concerned with the invocation by
a State Party of necessity "as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness
of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that
State". Article 25 presupposes that an act has been committed that is
incompatible with the State's international obligations and is therefore
"wrongful". Article XI, on the other hand, provides that "This Treaty
shall not preclude" certain measures so that, where Article XI applies,
the taking of such measures is not incompatible with the State's
international obligations and is not therefore "wrongful". Article 25 and
Article XI therefore deal with quite different situations. Article 25
cannot therefore be assumed to "define necessity and the conditions for
its operation" for the purpose of interpreting Article XI, still less to do
so as a mandatory norm of international law."138

As a result, while the CMS, Enron and Sempra tribunals considered that no
necessity could excuse Argentina's financial crisis-related measures and
suggested that there was possibly little difference between treaty and CIL
exceptions, the respective Annulment Committees both came to very
different conclusions. More or less implicitly (depending on the case), the
Committees also accepted the notion that states ought to have leeway in
their decision-making powers. The Committee in the Enron Annulment,
stated clearly that while tribunals ought to consider whether the authorities
could have relied on alternative measures, it is not for a tribunal to decide
whether the authorities should have opted of one reason over another. In so
doing, explicitly and repeatedly questioned who would be capable to decide
what course of action is suitable for the State.139 It is worth stressing again
that another point of agreement among the Committees is that treaty and
CIL exceptions are different and cannot be set on equal footing. That being
the case, the Committees have not applied common and consistent
reasoning or formulated clear guidelines in this regard. While the
Committee in Sempra rather clearly confirmed the CMS conclusion that
treaty and CIL are different, the Enron Committee refused to take a
position on this point and annulled the award due to the tribunal's failure to
adequately discuss the relevant issues.
The above points are important as they suggest that despite several cases
(and their respective annulments) there is so far no clear rule as to how to
rely on and apply treaty and CIL exceptions. Interestingly, the recent
tribunal in Urbaser v. Argentina confirms this particular conclusion, although
as will be explained below, does so by only considering one of the two
sources of exception.
137. Id. at para. 199.
138. Id. at para. 200.
139. See Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 105, at para. 309, 360-78, 392-93.
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In December 2016, the tribunal in Urbaserv. Argentina also dealt with the
issue of necessity,140 but the award made no mention of "Non-Precluded
Measures" clauses and essentially focused on the Customary Law-based and
necessity-based argument. Thus, without providing any legal analysis, the
award rather matter-of-factly acknowledged that a state of necessity can have
priority over investment considerations before concluding that Argentina
did not have a choice in taking its measures.141
More specifically, the tribunal first focused on section 2 of Article 25 ILC
and commented on the idea that necessity exceptions cannot be invoked
where the state is responsible for the duress situation at stake. In this regard,
the tribunal found no proof that Argentina could be held responsible for the
alleged state of emergency. Perhaps more interesting, the tribunal insisted
that a finding of responsibility would require the demonstration "that the
Government must have known that such crisis and emergency must have
been the outcome of its economic and financial policy."142
The tribunal next considered section 1 of Article 25 ILC and discussed
whether Argentina had alternative means of acting. To the tribunal, the
issue of regulatory alternatives depended on two perspectives, "the wide one,
taking into account the needs of Argentina and its population nation-wide,
and the narrower one of the situation of investors engaged in performing
contracts protected by the international obligations arising out of one of the
many BITs."143 Hence, the tribunal considered that the claimant ought to

have offered "at least a serious indication as to the nature of other measures
that had been available to the Government at that time"44 and concluded
that its argument was "too short" in that it failed to "resolve the [hosts']
conflict between the obligation to guarantee the Concessionaire's right
under the Concession and the access of the poor and vulnerable population
to water when this cannot be ensured otherwise than by failing to comply
with the host State's obligations toward the Concessionaire."145 As a result,
the tribunal concluded that Argentina had indeed faced "a situation of state
of necessity as sufficient support for the emergency measures when
promulgated in January 2002"146 and emphasized that, overall, contract
renegotiation would have been the only alternative method.147
3.

Preliminary Conclusions

The few cases that had an opportunity to clarify the state of the law on
prudential measures in times of financial instability thus provided interesting
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Urbaser Award, supra note 104.
Id. at para. 683-730.
Id. at para. 711.
Id. at para. 716.
Id. at para. 717.
Id. at para. 720.
Urbaser Award, supra note, at para. 718.
Id. at para. 730-32.
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ways to deal with the circumstances but did not do so in a consistent manner
and thus did not definitively resolve the issue.
More specifically, while the tribunals identified two methods of allowing a
certain degree of regulatory freedom to the host states in times of financial
duress, their analysis has failed in two main regards. First, and most
obviously, the tribunals have failed to determine which of the interpretive
methods ought to prevail over the other, or more precisely when and to what
extent one should prevail over the alternative approach. Second, the
tribunals failed to provide robust guidelines capable of equipping states (and
future tribunals) with a reliable methodological precedent.
Thus, while the tribunals provided a direction towards prudential
regulatory freedom, the precise legal mechanisms for framing and
processing such freedom remains unclear. On the one hand, the earliest
cases did not make equal use of or give similar weight to the Customary
International Law based notion of exceptions precluding wrongfulness and
have rather used and relied on treaty-based NPM clauses in order to allow
for exceptions to treaty obligations. In fact, and as explained before,
Annulment proceedings have largely insisted on whether the two sources of
exceptions ought to be treated similarly. On the other hand, the recent
Urbaser case relied exclusively on a CIL-based reasoning in order to allow
for exceptions to treaty obligations. Of course, the approach of the Urbaser
tribunal was in itself taken by necessity as the applicable BIT between
Argentina and Spain does not contain any NPM clause.14s Nonetheless,
while this explains why the award does not contain the word "non-precluded
measure," the tribunal's logic and decision to apply a CIL-based exception is
at odds with the findings of previous Annulment Committees in implying
that exceptions can be found with or without explicitly drafted treaty
provisions for this purpose. Given this, one would have expected to find a
discussion in the award as to what the presence or absence of such a clause
could have meant for the investor and the host. If other tribunals follow the
reasoning of the Urbaser tribunal, the decision of the parties to include (or
not include) an NPM clause could be rendered entirely moot.
Regardless, the point to be made here is that there is a trend in the
investment tribunal case law pointing towards a general ability of host states
to take on measures for prudential reasons, but that the trend is not
anchored to a robust and predictable legal framework.
B.

ADDITIONAL CASE LAW

Several other investment awards deserve mention even though the
insights they provide are far more limited than the cases highlighted in the
previous subsection. In the main, these awards did not proceed due to
jurisdictional issues and thus failed to fully discuss and interpret the
prudential measure. Moreover, while these cases have been described as
148. Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Kingdom of Spain on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, adopted Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 202.
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relating to prudential measures,1 49 most only briefly mention or do not even
contain the term "prudential measure." For instance, the word "prudential"
appears only once in KTAsia Investment Group, in a factual manner as part of
a descriptive section of the award and without any analysis of the concept.5 0
Likewise, in Renee Rose Levy, the phrase "prudential regulator" is again
mentioned once and without any analysis of prudential measures being
taken.'5' Another example is PingAn Life Insurance, which directly relates to
financial matters, but the tribunal does not make mention of financial crisis
or prudential measures.1 52
Having said this, some other cases provide further evidence of the trend
towards regulatory freedom in regards to prudential measures. For instance,
while the word "prudential" does not appear in Poitovd Banka, the decision
nonetheless emphasized that, economic crisis or not, a "sovereign debt is an
instrument of government monetary and economic policy and its impact at
the local and international levels makes it an important tool for the handling
of social and economic policies of a State."15

In other words, while the

tribunal did not elaborate on the ability of host states to take prudential
measures in order to safeguard financial stability, it nonetheless noted the
importance of preserving room for financial, economic, and monetary
policy.
While making no mention of prudential measures, the previously
mentioned Renee Rose Levy tribunal did make two important statements
concerning a host states actions in time of financial crisis. First, the tribunal
emphasised that "it [is] logical to assume that State authorities would take
measures to maintain the stability of the financial system, as mandated by
Peruvian law and, to that end, promulgate Emergency Decrees."54 Second,
the tribunal recognized the important role to be played by financial
authorities in times of financial crises and stated that the relevant
governmental authority "should contribute to the stability of the financial
system, for which purpose it has discretionary powers, and that no bank has
the power to require [it] to act in a certain way in order to disprove
rumors."ss
Another example in this regard is the Saluka Award, where the tribunal
had to deal with an investor claiming that its legitimate expectations had
been frustrated by the introduction of more stringent prudential rules on
banks.156 On the one hand, the tribunal emphasized "that the increased
149. See Mitchell, Hawkins and Mishra, supra note 4.
150. See KT Asia Investment Group B.V. v. Kazakhstan, ARB/09/8, Award (ICSID 2013).
151. See Renee Rose Levy de Levi v. Peru, ARB/10/17, Award (ICSID 2014) [hereinafter Renee
Award].
152. See Ping An Life Ins. Co. v. Belgium, ARB/12/29, Award (ICSID 2015).
153. Pogtova banka, a.s v. Hellenic Republic, ARB/13/8 para. 324, Award (ICSID 2015).
154. Renee Award, supra note 151, at para. 323.
155. Id. at para. 335.
156. Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award (UNCITRAL 2006), at
para. 354.
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stringency of the CNB's prudential rules contributed to the distress suffered
by the Czech banking system by forcing the banks to increase provisioning.
Consequently, it became even more difficult for the banks to meet the
regulatory capital requirements than it had been before due to the bad loan
problem".57 On the other hand, it nonetheless insisted that the "tightening
the regulatory regime" had to be seen as part of a larger European Accession
process 5 and concluded that the host's financial policy was not a breach of
the treaty standards.159
Another relevant case is Fireman'sFund Insurance, which had the potential
to provide important interpretive guidance but did not engage in any legal
reasoning on the issue. The case was the first brought under Chapter
Fourteen (cross-border investment in Financial Services) of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) following a financial crisis in
Mexico (and a 96% reduction in the value of the Mexican peso) in the mid1990s.160 In defending the claim brought by an investor concerning the loss
of investment in financial products, Mexico emphasised that the
"sophisticated investor . . . made a risky investment in a bank at a time that
there was a very serious financial crisis in Mexico"61 and argued "that the

measures in question are 'reasonable measures for prudential reasons' within
the meaning of Article 1410 (Exceptions) of the NAITA."162 Article 1410,
as a reminder, provides that "nothing [. .

.]

shall be construed to prevent a

Party from adopting or maintaining reasonable measures for prudential
reasons, such as:
(a) the protection of investors, depositors, financial market participants,
policyholders, policy claimants, or persons to whom a fiduciary duty
is owed by a financial institution or cross-border financial service
provider;
(b) the maintenance of the safety, soundness, integrity or financial
responsibility of financial institutions or cross-border financial
service providers; and
157. Id. at para. 356.
158. A particularity of the Saluka case lies in the fact that the Czech Government justified its
financial regulatory measures by the fact that the country had signed a pre-accession agreement
with the European Commission committing it to bring its regulatory regime into line with the
norms in the European Union. In 1999 a "Twinning Programme" for banking supervision had
been launched to adjust the Czech regulatory methodology and the practical implementation of
banking supervision to European Union standards. See id. at para. 357.
159. Id. at para. 500 ("The Tribunal does not find, however, that the Respondent has violated
its 'fair and equitable treatment' obligation by a failure to ensure a predictable and transparent
framework for Saluka's investment. Neither was the increase of the provisioning burden for
nonperforming loans unpredictable for Saluka/Nomura, nor could Saluka/Nomura legitimately
expect that the Czech Republic would fix the legal shortcomings regarding the protection of
creditor's rights and the enforcement of loan security within a timescale of help to Nomura.").
160. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. The United Mexican States, ARB(AF)/02/1, Award (ICSID
2006) [hereinafter Fireman Award].
161. Id. at para. 116.
162. Id. at para. 156.
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(c) ensuring the integrity and stability of a Party's financial system. 6 3
The tribunal did not engage in, discuss, or contribute to the NPM vs
Customary International Law exceptions debate. Instead, the tribunal
simply held that before considering an exception a measure must be found to
be inconsistent with a provision of the NAITA164 and concluded that in the
case at stake "the condition precedent for invocation of the Prudential
Measures Exception, a finding of expropriation, ha[d] not been

fulfilled."65

Hence, it found that it had no ground for proceeding with a further analysis
of the prudential exception and left the issue untouched.
C.

CONVERGENCE WITH

WTO

LAW?

-

While the above analysis demonstrates the lack of uniformity in the
investment jurisprudence on prudential measures, the various investment
tribunals have nonetheless paved the way towards recognizing a right to
regulate for the preservation of financial stability. In this regard, three
important aspects are worth emphasising.
First, and from a very practical point of view, the investment case law
and in particular the Annulment Proceedings - have provided host states
with a certain amount of latitude when regulating for the preservation of
economic and financial stability, despite the existence of clear obligations
contained in the treaty. At the same time, the awards have failed to clarify
whether the overall state of an economy could constitute an acceptable
essential interest susceptible of justifying necessity or even whether an
economic crisis would constitute a sufficient peril justifying the taking of
special measures. The Annulment Committees have, however, for the most
part agreed that two distinct exceptions exist which are capable of precluding
wrongfulness in specific situations, unlike the initial awards which barely
considered the issues.
Notable in this regard is the Continental Casualty award, which stated that
a tribunal's "objective assessment" on regulatory matters "must contain a
significant margin of appreciation for the State applying the particular
measure: a time of grave crisis is not the time for nice judgments,
particularly when examined by others with the disadvantage of hindsight".166
Similarly, while the Urbaseraward lacked legal analysis, it rather significantly
highlighted the importance of differentiating between a wide perspective
"taking into account the needs of Argentina and its population nation-wide"
and a "narrower .

.

. situation of investors engaged in performing contracts

protected by the international obligations arising out of one of the many
BITs".167 Thus, while commentators have asserted that "to date, [the
163. NAFTA, supra note 109.
164. Fireman Award, supra note 160, at para. 160.
165. Id. at para. 165.
166. Continental Casualty, supra note 104, at para. 181.
167. Urbaser Award, supra note 104, para 716. ('. . . the question whether "other means" were
available has to be captured in both perspectives: the wide one, taking into account the needs of

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018]

CONVERGENCE OF TRADE & INVESTMENT LAW

583

relevant case law] provide[s] little direct guidance on the interpretation
prudential exceptions",168 it is our contention that despite the absence of
direct discussion and decisions on prudential matters per se, this case law
nevertheless points very clearly towards regulatory freedom in times of
financial duress and thus contains important indicative value.
The second point worth emphasizing is that the findings of investment
tribunals are converging with those of the WTO Appellate Body in
Argentina - Financial Services. Although the arbitral findings are complex
and not entirely consistent, the investment tribunals have found consensus
and therefore agree with the WTO Appellate Body that governments have
the right to retain the ability to regulate in times of economic turmoil and
instability.
The third observation is that while Argentina - FinancialServices provided

extensive analysis of treaty-based exceptions, the investment tribunals have
failed to reach consensus on the proper interpretation. If some have
emphasized the relevance of NPM clauses towards wrongfulness preclusion
and would therefore seem to be in line with the WTO jurisprudence, other
tribunals discussed the opportunity of CIL-grounded exceptions,
particularly in the absence of NPM provisions in the applicable treaties.
Hence, the investment jurisprudence to date leaves us uncertain whether
CIL exceptions might make the treaty-based NPM exception moot and
without legal effect. Simply put, the ease with which the Urbaser tribunal
ignored the NPM argument (and the lack of a NPM clause in the relevant
treaty) and entirely focused on CIL suggests that - if future tribunals
followed the path - prudential measures could be dealt with under
investment law as a matter of CIL and without the need for a more specific
treaty provision.169

-

Argentina and its population nation-wide, and the narrower one of the situation of investors
engaged in performing contracts protected by the international obligations arising out of one of
the many BITs').
168. See Mitchell, Hawkins and Mishra, supra note 4, at 15.
169. To this extent, it is also worth noting that while investment tribunals have so far
considered the possibility of justifying measures taken for prudential reasons by making
reference to necessity, some commentators have also highlighted the idea of relying on 'Force
majeure' as a relevant tool for use by States. Gourgourinis, in particular, notes that in various
cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) and of the Permanent Court of International Justice, financial crisis
particularly the recent Greek crisis - could be considered as force majeure and preclude
wrongfulness. Thus, the margin of appreciation doctrine might in the future be considered by
investment tribunals either through necessity or force majeure, with the latter perhaps
providing a more flexible exception in that the role played by the host state in creating the crisis
would not be given the same weight. For more details on the force majeure discussion, See
Anastasios Gourgourinis, Financial crisis as force majeure under internationallaw and EU law:
Defending emergency measures, 4 l'europienne in investment arbitrationunder intra-EUBITs, INT'L
INVESTMENT L. AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE, 281-315, 311-313 (2017).
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Concluding Remarks

The main observation of this analysis is that there is a growing consensus
both in trade and investment jurisprudence towards a right to regulate for
prudential reasons and in order to preserve financial stability.
Investment tribunals and the WTO panel/Appellate Body demonstrate an
awareness and appreciation of broader, societal interests and in the main
avoided interpreting the relevant treaties in a narrow and constricting
manner. Both fora agree that the prudential carve-out clause is meant to be
functional and to provide States with regulatory room in the face of financial
crisis. The recent jurisprudence in both fora also provides several valuable
and instructive lessons as to the effectiveness of prudential provisions.
Among those lessons is the distinction the Panel in Argentina - Financial

-

Services made between the commonly used term "prudential measure" and
the preferred understanding that the subject matter must refer to measures
that are being taken "for prudential reasons." The distinction between a
"prudential measure" and a measure taken "for prudential reasons" may at
first appear illusory, but the Panel spent some time explaining the
divergence in meaning and effect of the difference in meaning and this
distinction will likely survive and be used in future disputes.
Another related lesson is the focus of both the investment and trade
disputes on the circumstances in which the measures have been designed
i.e. whether the measures operate in line with the exceptional goal they serve
or whether the mechanisms put into place generate a certain degree of
unfairness detrimental to the legitimately pursued goal. In this regard, the
tribunals have shown a high degree of deference to the host government
while at the same time applying the prudential provisions as a good faith or
anti-abuse mechanism in a manner similar to the general exception clauses
of GAT and the GATS (less the need for a necessity test).
The third lesson is that the tribunals have gone some way in clarifying the
context in which exceptions may legitimately occur. While the investment
tribunals have not been hesitant to engage in second guessing policy
decisions of host governments, it is noteworthy that those decisions that
rejected the notion of preserving economic stability were annulled.
Meanwhile, the LGAE tribunal held that exceptions could be justified by
aggregate devastating economic, political and social conditions. Similarly,
the Panel in Argentina - FinancialServices concluded that measures could be

taken for "preventive or precautionary reasons" so as to prevent a risk,
injury, or danger that does not necessarily have to be imminent and that
Members should be granted a certain dose of freedom when assessing the
necessity to act. Although the jurisprudence between the investment and
trade spheres is not in complete harmony - for instance, the time limitation
criteria listed by investment tribunals has not been confirmed by the WTO
Panel - the decisions do pave the way for the emergence of a definitive
standard, regardless of whether the standard in trade and investment law
differs.
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The fourth lesson is that carve-out provisions are not uniformly drafted in
most investment and trade agreements, and thus the interpretation of each
provision will not necessarily correspond to the interpretation of another
provision with even slightly different wording. This is critical to some
issues, including when determining whether the provision contains a
temporal limitation. In essence, a rather large question regarding the
prudential carve-out is whether such measures have to be temporary in
nature. In contrast with the findings of investment arbitral tribunals,
Argentina - FinancialServices suggests that governments facing the threat of

-

financial instability could take long-term regulatory measures and remain in
compliance with Paragraph 2(a) of the Annex, provided that the measures
are indeed taken for prudential reasons and without intent to escape existing
trade obligations.
The fifth lesson is that while there is an emerging jurisprudence relating
to prudential measures, it is important to remember that the tribunals have
relied upon different assessment methods in reaching their determinations.
The investment tribunals considered whether states could regulate on the
grounds of both customary law exceptions and lex specialis provisions (NPM)
specifically drafted to offer carve-out opportunities in times of duress. In
contrast, the VVTO tribunal assessed whether a prudential measure could
qualify as a general exception to GATS commitments (under Article XIV)
and whether the carve-out clause contained in its lex specialis Annex on
Financial Services could qualify a measure as a valid exception to existing
commitments. In the end - and most importantly - the conclusions of both
the investment and trade tribunals largely converge in terms of direction but
perhaps tend to diverge in terms of logic. The tribunals share a common
reliance on a two-step procedure involving the identification of a special
objective and establishment of a cause and effect relationship (to ensure that
regulatory measures avoid arbitrariness, unjustifiable discrimination and do
not constitute disguised restrictions on existing obligations). A divergence,
however, occurs as the depth of the logic provided by the WTO Appellate
Body is much more significant than that of investment tribunals which have
tended to focus on and make factual assessments without spending much
time on the legal analysis. The classic example here is the recent Urbaser
case, which while relying on a CIL approach to justify the use of a prudential
measure (due to the lack of NPM clause in the applicable treaty) provided no
analysis for the decision or on the legal consequences (or lack thereof) of the
absence of a NPM clause in the treaty.
A final lesson is that both the trade and investment tribunals have
recognized a right of States/Members to take measures deemed necessary to
preserve their essential interests against a threat of instability - that is,
before the emergence of a crisis renders action too late and moot
notwithstanding existing commitments, and as long as certain requirements
are observed. This is in an important point because, although the idea has
long been defended in the doctrinal debates, until now it lacked the
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jurisprudence to substantiate the position and counter critics offering a
different viewpoint.
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